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This shift in framing changes what reform looks like. Calls for fairer hiring practices, broader access, or more sophisticated metrics assume that talent exists as a latent attribute awaiting better discovery. However, if talent is a retrospective construct - assembled after the fact from outcomes and institutional validation - then such reforms address surface inequities while leaving the underlying fiction intact. They improve the optics of selection without resolving its conceptual foundations.
A Global, Structural Phenomenon
The dynamics described here are not culturally idiosyncratic nor confined to any single institutional setting. Across advanced economies - liberal, coordinated, and state-led alike - the same patterns recur, credential inflation, elite reproduction, and retrospective narratives of talent. These dynamics surface not only in private firms but also in public institutions and academia, spanning contexts with different regulatory regimes, welfare systems, and professional cultures. Healthcare and life sciences organisations offer a clear illustration. In pharmaceutical R&D, academic medicine, MedTechs, and biotech start-ups, hiring and promotion are governed by credentialing, peer review, and evidence-based evaluation. Yet advancement is routinely justified through post hoc attributions of “scientific talent,” “clinical judgement,” or “innovative capacity,” even where outcomes depend on team composition, institutional infrastructure, regulatory timing, and access to capital or patient populations. Success is retrospectively individualised, while failure is depersonalised or attributed to exogenous risk - reproducing hierarchy without requiring a stable or measurable account of individual contribution. This convergence points to a structural rather than cultural explanation. Wherever labour markets allocate rewards under conditions of uncertainty, and wherever unequal outcomes demand moral and institutional justification, talent emerges as a convenient fiction. Its substantive content varies - coded as “excellence,” “leadership,” or “translational impact” - but its function remains constant. Talent provides a portable language through which contingent advantage is stabilised, hierarchy rendered legitimate, and selection practices insulated from political contestation. Seen in this light, the global spread of talent discourse is not evidence of its empirical validity, but of its adaptability. It travels easily across borders and sectors because it resolves a shared problem faced by modern healthcare and life sciences systems: how to organise high-stakes expertise, distribute prestige and reward, and sustain inequality at scale while preserving the appearance of scientific and moral fairness.
What Would Replace Talent?
Rejecting talent does not entail rejecting evaluation, differentiation, or standards. Organisations must still allocate roles, responsibilities, and rewards. The challenge is not whether to evaluate, but how to do so without relying on fictive moral narratives that repackage uncertainty and contingency as individual virtue. From Individual Excellence to Systemic Contribution One alternative is to shift evaluation away from individuals and toward systems of work. A substantial body of organisational research shows that outcomes are better explained by collective processes - coordination, learning, communication, and resilience - than by stable individual traits. As demonstrated in Leading Teams, team design and organisational context account for more variance in performance than the personal qualities of team members. Rewarding systemic contribution reframes performance as emergent rather than intrinsic, recognising that value is produced through interaction, infrastructure, and institutional support rather than isolated excellence. From Selection to Allocation A second shift is from selection to allocation. Rather than claiming to identify the “best” candidates, ex ante, organisations can treat hiring and promotion as provisional placements under uncertainty. Structured experimentation - through role rotation, probationary assignments, and feedback-driven reassignment - acknowledges that fit and effectiveness are discovered over time. This approach replaces the fiction of predictive certainty with mechanisms for learning and adjustment, making error correction a feature of the system rather than a moral failure of individuals. From Moral Narratives to Institutional Accountability Finally, inequality itself should be justified institutionally rather than morally. Pay differentials, authority, and hierarchy should be defended in terms of functional necessity - coordination costs, responsibility, or scarcity - rather than superior worth. This shift would require greater transparency about how rewards are set and a willingness to revise structures that fail to deliver collective value. Inequality becomes a contingent organisational choice, open to evaluation and reform, rather than a naturalised outcome of individual merit. Taken together, these shifts do not abolish judgement; they relocate it. Evaluation moves from character to contribution, from prediction to learning, and from moral status to institutional design.
Takeaways
We do confuse title with talent - and this confusion is not harmless; it is strategic risk. “Markets reward talent” works as a comforting story: it reassures winners, disciplines everyone else, and makes inequality feel deserved. But talent, as markets use it, cannot bear that load: it is not cleanly observable, reliably portable, or consistently predictive. More often it is assembled after the fact - manufactured through visibility, sponsorship, and narrative control - then retrofitted into a morality tale called “merit”. So, when markets do not reward “true” talent, that is not a glitch in a fair system; it is the system doing what it is built to do: allocate under uncertainty while supplying moral cover. Dropping the fiction would not erase hierarchy - it would remove inequality’s moral alibi, forcing disparities to be justified by function, responsibility, risk, and collective value rather than implied virtue. That is a harder argument. It is also the accountable one - and it is why this is the confusion worth confronting.
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